Il Guardian ricostrusce la tecnica con cui Bradley Manning è riuscito a "rubare" i documenti che ora sono nelle mani di WikiLeaks. E descrive cosa c'è nei cable - cioè informazioni, analisi di scenario, rapporti di intelligence espresse in una lingua sicuramente non diplomatica - e cosa non c'è - cioè i segreti scottanti e le operazioni "coperte" che hanno un altro grado di segretezza. Non è detto che le rivelazioni siano qualcosa di più di pettegolezzi raccolti in giro e tenuti insieme dalle deduzione logiche dei funzionari che li hanno scritti. Al tempo stesso, però, danno un'idea del comune sentire della comunità diplomatica USA rispetto ad alcuni leader (come Berlusconi) e ai problemi geopolitici più scottanti. Insomma, siamo nel back office, ma la cassaforte per ora resta nascosta.
There are 251,287 dispatches in all, from more than 250 US embassies and consulates. They reveal how the US deals with both its allies and its enemies – negotiating, pressuring and sometimes brusquely denigrating foreign leaders, all behind the firewalls of ciphers and secrecy classifications that diplomats assume to be secure. The leaked cables range up to the "SECRET NOFORN" level, which means they are meant never to be shown to non-US citizens. As well as conventional political analyses, some of the cables contain detailed accounts of corruption by foreign regimes, as well as intelligence on undercover arms shipments, human trafficking and sanction-busting efforts by would-be nuclear states such as Iran and Libya. Some are based on interviews with local sources while others are general impressions and briefings written for top state department visitors who may be unfamiliar with local nuances. Intended to be read by officials in Washington up to the level of the secretary of state, the cables are generally drafted by the ambassador or subordinates. Although their contents are often startling and troubling, the cables are unlikely to gratify conspiracy theorists. They do not contain evidence of assassination plots, CIA bribery or such criminal enterprises as the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan years, when anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas were covertly financed. One reason may be that America's most sensitive "top secret" and above foreign intelligence files cannot be accessed from Siprnet, the defence department network involved.
The Guardian
